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SEIZURE BY ROADBLOCK: DECISIONAL LAW ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DRUNK DRIVING ROADBLOCKS
INTRODUCTION
There has recently been a tremendous increase in public awareness of the
drunk driving problem.' This increase is largely a result of efforts by lobbying
organizations such as Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD), Remove In-
toxicated Drivers (RID) and Students Against Drunk Drivers (SADD). These
organizations have pressured both elected and law enforcement officials into
taking action against drunk drivers.' State legislatures have enacted tough new
anti-drunk driving laws,3 and federal law now provides supplemental highway
grants to states which implement safety programs designed to reduce alcohol
related accidents. 4
Responding to the mounting public pressure, law enforcement officials
have increased their traditional detection and deterrence efforts,5 and have also
resorted to the use of drunk driving (DUI) roadblocks. Roadblocks set up for
the purpose of detecting and deterring drunk drivers have been used in at least
It is estimated that over 25,000 persons a year die in alcohol-related traffic accidents. Flaherty, As
Roadblock Proliferate, Questions of Legality Persist, NATL. L.J., July 25, 1983, at 3, 39, col. I. It is also
estimated that drunk drivers cause nearly one million nonfatal injuries and five billion dollars in property
damage per year. Lauter, The Drunk Driving Blitz, NAT'L. L.J., Mar. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
'For an extensive review of public and governmental reaction to the drunk driving problem, See Note, Curb-
ing the Drunk Driver under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo.
L.J. 1457, 1457-58 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Curbing the Drunk Driver].
Grass roots groups such as MADD and RID have formed chapters in every state. Note, The Constitu-
tionality of Roadblocks Conducted to Detect Drunk Drivers in Indiana, 17 IND. L. REV. 1065, 1065 n.3.
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Drunk Drivers in Indiana 1.
'In 1982, twenty-one states passed laws increasing penalties for drunk driving. Jacobs and Strossen, Mass In-
vestigations Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving
Roadblocks, 18 U.C.D. L. REV. 595, 596 n.l [hereinafter cited as Mass Investigations].
In 1982, the Ohio legislature enacted a stricter drunk driving law. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4511.19,
4511.191 (Baldwin 1983) for presumption; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99 (Baldwin 1983) for penalties.
See also Bender, Ohio s New Alcohol Impaired Driving Law - A Judicial Perspective, 15 U. TOL. L. REV.
117 (1983) for an in-depth analysis of the law.
In addition to stricter anti-drunk driving laws, the overall campaign against drunk driving includes: 1) new
initiatives at all levels of government; 2) stricter law enforcement; 3) publicity; 4) citizens groups such as
MADD and SADD; 5) National Driver Licensing and Control. National driver licensing has been ac-
complished by the enactment of the National Driver Register (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 408). The National
Driver Register is an attempt to keep drivers with suspended licenses from obtaining licenses in other states.
U.S. DEP'r OF TRANS. NHJTSA, PUB. No. DOT HS 809 516, ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY: PROFES-
SIONAL PAPERS ON STATE AND FEDERAL DRIVER LICENSING PROGRAMS 35 (March 1984).
423 U.S.C. § 408 (1982). In order to qualify a state must adopt four minimum criteria: 1) state law must
define intoxication as a blood alcohol level of 0.10%; 2) state law must provide a prompt, minimum license
suspension of 90 days for first offenders and one year for repeat offenders; 3) state law must provide for a 48
hour prison term or 10 days community service for second offenders; 4) the state must increase enforcement
efforts and conduct public awareness campaigns. Id.
'The traditional method of detecting and deterring drunk drivers is with roving marked patrols acting on
observed violations. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Ct., 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983). Police may
stop cars upon a reasonable articulable suspicion of a violation of some law for which either the driver or an
occupant would be subject to seizure. Id. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
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twenty-one states' Although there is no typical DUI roadblock,7 most involve
police officers stopping vehicles in a non-random fashion in order to determine
the driver's sobriety. DUI roadblocks have drawn support from both govern-
mental and private sources9 despite serious questions concerning their constitu-
tionality."0
6Up. Cal. Att'y Gen. 471, 472 (citing NATIONAL TRANSP. SAFETY BD., DETERRENCE OF DRUNK DRIVING:
THE ROLE OF SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS AND ADMIN. LICENSE REVOCATIONS (1984)).
The Ohio State Highway Patrol has not conducted DUI roadblocks. The only Ohio jurisdiction which has
used DUI roadblocks is the City of Mentor, which only conducted a few before the program was cancelled.
Telephone interview with Lt. Jack Holland of the Ohio State Highway Patrol (Dec. 31, 1985). The Ohio
State Highway Patrol does not consider DUI roadblocks to be as productive as roving patrols given the same
expenditure of manpower. Id. See also Buraker, The "Roadblock'" Strategy as a Drunken Driver Enforce-
ment Measure, 51 POLICE CHIEF, Apr. 1984, at 59, 49-62 ("[it has not been] demonstrated... that they are
especially efficacious as a drunken driver enforcement measure").
'Rodgers, The Drunk Driving Roadblock: Random Seizure or Minimal Instrusion?, 21 CRIM. L. BULL 197,
204 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Random Seizure].
8Courts upholding DUI roadblocks have not required that police stop every vehicle. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, 10.8(g) (Supp. 1986).
The National Transportation Safety Board has recommended the following procedures for a constitu-
tionally permissible DUI roadblock:
1) Police agencies select the times of operation and locations of checkpoints, based on empirical evi-
dence of high DWI [driving while intoxicated] activity or alcohol-related crashes.
2) Checkpoint sites are established with high visibility, including warning signs, flashing lights, flares,
police vehicles, and the presence of uniformed officers.
3) Police officers conducting the checkpoint either stop all traffic or use some preestablished, nonbi-
ased formula to decide which vehicles to stop; for example, every tenth vehicle.
4) After being stopped, a motorist may be requested to produce a driver's license or vehicle registra-
tion and is asked questions while the officer looks for signs of alcohol impairment. In some cases
where license/registration checks are not made, the stop is very brief (fifteen to thirty seconds).
5) Based on his or her observations, the police officer either waves the motorist on or directs him or
her to a secondary area for further investigation. In the latter case, a roadside psychomotor test
(e.g., walking a straight line) or a breath-alcohol test is usually requested.
6) If the driver fails these tests and the officer has probable cause, the motorist is arrested for DWI.
7) The arrested driver is then transported to the station for booking and is requested to submit to an
evidential breath-alcohol test. Refusal to submit to such a test invokes the State's implied consent
penalties.
NATIONAL TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY STUDY, DETERRENCE OF DRUNK DRIVING: THE ROLE OF SOBRIETY
CHECKPOINTS AND ADMIN. LICENSE REVOCATIONS (1984).
'The use of drunk driving roadblocks is listed as a measure a state may take in order to qualify for supple-
mental highway funds. 23 C.F.R. § 1309.6(11) (1984). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) has published operational procedures for conducting drunk driving roadblocks. OFFICE OF ALCO.
HOL COUNTERMEASURES AND OFFICE OF DRIVER AND PEDESTRIAN RESEARCH, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF TRANSP., THE USE OF SAFETY CHECKPOINTS FOR DWI ENFORCEMENT (1983).
Various citizens groups such as MADD and RID as well as police officials and prosecutors which com-
prise the New York Governor's Alcohol and Highway Safety Task Force have endorsed the use of
systematic sobriety checkpoints. Mass Investigations, supra note 3 at 597 n.4.
In 1983 The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving endorsed the use of roadblocks as part of a com-
prehensive program to combat drunk driving. Id. at 597 (citing PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIV-
ING, FINAL REPORT 14 (1983).
Public reaction to DUI roadblocks has been mixed. See Curbing the Drunk Driver, supra note 2 at 1458
n.3. However, in the long run, DUI checkpoint stops may annoy drivers, who must wait in line when they
have not violated any laws. Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protec-
tions, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 135 (1984) lhereinafter cited as Sobriety Checkpoints] (citing the comments of
the International Assoc. of Chiefs of Police, "Citizens ... consider such roadblocks as a nuisance").
"0Flaherty, As Roadblocks Proliferate, Questions of Legality Persist, NATL L.J. July 25, 1983, at 3, 39;
West, N.H. Court Holds Roadblocks Unconstitutional, NA'L L.J., Sept. 8, 1985, at 8; Reskin, State
Supreme Court Split on Roadblocks, 72 A.B.A.J., Jan. 1986, at 126. Couric, Flash of Genius, 71 A.B.A.J.
Nov. 1985, at 25.
[Vol. 19:3
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The extensive use of DUI roadblocks was promoted by dictum in the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. Prouse." The Prouse
Court held that the police practice of randomly stopping vehicles for license
and registration checks violated the fourth amendment. 2 However, supporters
of DUI roadblocks point to dictum in the Prouse decision which states: "This
holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from develop-
ing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve
the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at
roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative."' 3
This comment will examine decisions addressing the constitutionality of
roadblock stops. First, it will examine Delaware v. Prouse and other Supreme
Court decisions which have developed what is referred to as the neutral criteria
standard for judging the reasonableness of temporary automobile seizures at
roadblock-type stops. 4 Under the neutral criteria standard, law enforcement
officers may conduct suspicionless seizures of vehicles at roadblocks for certain
specific purposes. The neutral criteria standard requires that the seizure be car-
ried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the con-
duct of individual officers. 5 Second, the comment will examine decisions
which have found roadblocks to be constitutional. Third, decisions will be ex-
amined which have found DUI roadblocks to be inherently unconstitutional,
suggesting that the neutral criteria standard is not applicable to roadblocks
conducted to enforce drunk driving laws.
FEDERAL CASE LAW DEVELOPING A STANDARD FOR SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES
OR SEIZURES - NEUTRAL CRITERIA
Even temporarily stopping a vehicle at a roadblock is a seizure within the
1"440 U.S. 648 (1979). See infra notes.
In the only pre-Ptouse decision on the constitutionality of a DUI roadblock, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota held that the roadblock involved did not conform to the permanent checkpoint approved in United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976).
The lack of case law or statutory law authorizing DUI roadblocks before 1979, strongly suggests that DUI
roadblocks were rarely conducted. See Sobriety Checkpoints, supra note 9 at 132 n.64.
"Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
'
3Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (footnote omitted).
"See Comment, Filling in the Blanks after Prouse: A New Standard for the Drinking-Driving Roadblock, 20
LAND AND WATER L. REV. 241 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Filling in the Blanks after Prousel.
"Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). As applied to roadblock seizures of motorists, the neutral criteria
standard involves "a predetermination by policy-making administrative officers of the roadblock location,
time, and procedures to be employed, pursuant to carefully formulated standards and neutral criteria." State
v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980). The Hilleshiem court did not consider this standard to be
determinative of the constitutional issue. The court mentioned two other factors as important: 1) safety con-
siderations relating to lighting and advance warning; 2) the level and nature of the subjective privacy intru-
sion. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d at 317-18. See Filling in the Blanks after Prouse, supra note 14, at 249 n.68.
COMMENTS
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meaning of the fourth amendment; therefore, roadblock stops must be
reasonable in order to pass constitutional muster. 6 The essential purpose of the
reasonableness requirement is to limit "the exercise of discretion by govern-
ment officials ... in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasion."' 7 The reasonableness of roadblock seizures, lile all
seizures less intrusive than a traditional arrest, is determined by balancing the
importance of the public interest being pursued against the individual's right to
be free from arbitrary interference by law officers. 8 This section examines two
areas where the Supreme Court has balanced the competing interests and
found temporary roadblock-type seizures to be reasonable absent individual-
ized suspicion: 1) border area illegal alien checkpoints; 19 2) license and registra-
tion checkpoints (Delaware v. Prouse). 2
Permanent Illegal Alien Checkpoints
United States v. Brigoni Ponce"' is the first of the so-called border search
cases to apply a balancing analysis to temporary vehicle stops. Brignoni-Ponce
involved the Border Patrol practice of using roving patrols to randomly stop
vehicles in order to question the vehicles' occupants about their citizenship and
immigration status.2 Two Border Patrol officers pursued and stopped the
defendant's car because its three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent.
The officers questioned the defendant and his passengers and learned that the
passengers were illegal aliens. The officers then arrested the defendant and
charged him with knowingly transporting illegal immigrants.2
"See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
"Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
"See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979).
The Brown Court's test for searches or seizures subject to the reasonableness-balancing approach contains
three parts. "A weighing of [(1)) the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, 1(2)] the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest, and 1(3)] the severity of the interference with individual liber-
ty." Id. at 50-51.
The Supreme Court has developed three distinct objective standards for judging the reasonableness of a
particular search or seizure. (i) The traditional approach involving probable cause and a warrant which is re-
quired for full-blown searches or seizures. See Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1617 (1985); Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1979). (2) The reasonable articulable suspicion standard governing searches
or seizures less intrusive than a traditional arrest or a full-blown search. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
(3) A neutral criteria standard governing the reasonableness of permanent illegal alien checkpoints located
near the border. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543.
The Supreme Court has consistently used the balancing test when judging the reasonableness of brief in-
vestigative seizures of automobiles. See Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (applying the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (applying the neutral criteria standard).
"See infra notes 21-53.
See infra notes 54-63.
2422 U.S. 873 (1975).
"Id. at 875. In a previous case the Court held that the fourth amendment prohibits the use of roving patrols
to search vehicles, without a warrant or probable cause, at points removed from the border or its functional
equivalents. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-75 (1973).
"Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 875.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:3
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The government contended that the requirement of individualized suspi-
cion was not applicable because the modest intrusion involved" was greatly
outweighed by the seriousness of the illegal alien problem. 5 The Court,
however, rejected the notion that residents of border areas26 should be subject
to "potentially unlimited interference . . . solely at the discretion of Border
Patrol officers."27 Although rejecting the government's contention, the Court
balanced the interests involved28 and found that roving patrol stops could be
justified by less than the traditional probable cause standard.29 The Court held
that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard established in Terry v.
Ohio30 was sufficient to justify the brief detention involved.3' According to this
standard a Border Patrol officer may conduct a roving stop and questioning
when his "observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle
may contain aliens illegally in the country."32
The Court cited three factors as justifying roving stops based on
reasonable suspicion: 1) the importance of the governmental interest; 2) the
minimal intrusion of a brief stop; 3) the absence of practical alternatives for
policing the border.3 The Court also considered the Terry standard ap-
propriate because "illegal alien traffic and . . . smuggling operations tend to
generate articulable grounds for identifying violators."3
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte35 is the only case in which the Court has
expressly sanctioned the use of suspicionless checkpoint stops. 36 Martinez-
2
"ld. at 880. "According to the government, all that is required of the vehicle's occupants is a response to a
brief question or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United
States." Id. This procedure was to last no more than a minute. Id.
Bld. at 880-82.
'
6According to statutory authority cited by the government as authorizing vehicle stops, border areas were
defined as anywhere within 100 miles of the 2,000 mile United States - Mexican border. Id. at 882-83.
"Id. at 882.
2 Specifically, the Court balanced the public interest roving patrol stops served by apprehending and deter-
ring illegal alien entries against the interference with individual liberty resulting from the stop and question-
ing. Id. at 878-79.
111d. at 880.
10392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3
"Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880. The Court made it clear that reasonable suspicion would only support a
"stop and inquiry" "reasonably related in scope to the [original] justification." Id. at 881 (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. I, 29. Thus, a further detention or search after a brief stop and questioning must be based on consent or
probable cause. Id. at 882.
121d. at 881. The Court concluded that the apparent Mexican ancestry of a vehicle's occupants, standing
alone, does not constitute a reasonable suspicion that the occupants are illegally in the country. Id.
33Id.
"Id. at 883. Thus, roving stops without individualized suspicion were not reasonable because sufficient, less
intrusive means were available to enforce immigration laws. See Id.
The extent to which a particular illegal activity tends to generate articulable cues often determines
whether individualized suspicion will be required. See infra notes 68, 98.
35428 U.S. 543 (1976).
36This checkpoint should be distinguished from those at the border or its functional equivalent. "Any person
or thing coming into the United States is subject to search by that fact alone," regardless of whether in-
dividualized suspension is present. United States v. Odland, 504 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1974). See generally W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.5(a)(1978).
Winter, 19861 COMMENTS
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Fuerte involved a permanent immigration checkpoint located on an interstate
route near San Clemente, which is sixty-six road miles north of the Mexican
border. 7 All traffic passing through the checkpoint was slowed down to a vir-
tual halt where a "point agent" would visually screen the vehicles in order to
determine whether a further inquiry was necessary." Vehicles selected for a
further inquiry were directed to a secondary inspection area where their oc-
cupants were asked about their citizenship and immigration status.39 The
defendants were arrested for illegally transporting aliens after questioning at
the secondary inspection area revealed that their passengers were illegal
aliens?° Martinez-Fuerte was convicted, but subsequently appealed contend-
ing that the operation of the checkpoint violated the fourth amendment. 1
The Court held that a brief stop and questioning may be made at
reasonably located checkpoints absent any individualized suspicion that the
particular vehicle contains illegal aliens.4 The Court reached this conclusion
by balancing the degree of intrusion caused by the checkpoint against the
government interest in preventing illegal immigration. Contrasting the privacy
intrusions at checkpoint stops with the suspicionless roving stops prohibited in
Brigoni-Ponce, the Court noted that:
[The] objective intrusion - the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual
inspection - also existed in roving patrol stops. But we view checkpoint
stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion - the generating
of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers - is appreciably
less in the case of a checkpoint stop.43
The Court seems to have based this conclusion on the physical characteristics
of a permanent checkpoint" and also on the lower level of discretionary law
"Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545. There were actually two checkpoints before the Court. A companion
case involved a checkpoint located on a highway near Sarita, Texas, sixty to ninety miles from the nearest
points of the Mexican border. Id. at 549-50. The Sarita checkpoint, unlike the San Clemente checkpoint, had
not been authorized by a warrant. Id. at 550.
"
8Id. at 546. The vast majority of vehicles passed through the checkpoint without any oral inquiry or close
visual inspection. Id.
"1d. "Point agents" had complete discretion in deciding which vehicles to direct to the secondary inspection
area. They were not required to point to articulable cues. Id. at 547.
41ld. at 548.
"Id. In United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), the Court held that the practice of routinely searching
private vehicles stopped at permanent checkpoints violated the fourth amendment. However, the Ortiz
Court specifically reserved the question of whether a brief stop and questioning at a checkpoint might be
reasonable. Id. at 897 n.3.
"
2Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-60.
"1Id. at 558.
'Essential to the holding were the procedures used by the border patrol officers at the fixed checkpoints: 1) a
large sign was located one mile before the checkpoint with flashing lights warning, "ALL VEHICLES,
STOP AHEAD, I MILE"; 2) three quarters of a mile later, two more signs over the highway with flashing
lights read "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS"; 3) the checkpoint was located at a California State weigh
station; 4) at the checkpoint, two large flashing signs read "STOP HERE - U.S. OFFICERS"; 5) orange
traffic cones were placed on the highway funneling traffic into two lanes where a border patrol agent in full
uniform stood beside a sign reading "STOP"; 6) U.S. border patrol vehicles with flashing lights blocked traf-
fic in unused lanes; 7) a permanent building was used for temporary detention facilities; 8) floodlights were
(Vol. 19:3
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enforcement activity involved."5 Field officers had no discretion in choosing
the location of the checkpoint and could stop only those cars passing through.'
6
According to the Court, "[tlhe regularized manner in which established check-
points are operated ... reassureles] . . . motorists that the stops are duly
authorized and believed to be in the public interest. 7
The Court found the minimal intrusion involved'8 to be outweighed by
the important government interest in preventing illegal immigration . 9 Spe-
cifically, the Court considered the reasonable suspicion standard required for
roving patrol stops to be impractical on major routes where the traffic is
heavy.50 Given this impracticability, border checkpoints were the only effective
method of deterring the well-disguised smuggling operations known to use the
major highways.5
Finally, the Court considered whether advanced authorization by a ju-
dicial warrant is required for the operation of fixed border checkpoints. In
holding that such a warrant is not required, the Court distinguished Camara v.
Municipal Court2 as "involv[ing] the search of private residences, for which a
warrant has traditionally been required."53 The Court also reasoned that in Ca-
mara the warrant served as proof of proper authorization, which is unneces-
sary at checkpoints given the "visible manifestations of the field officers
authority."'"
License and Registration Checkpoints
In Delaware v. Prouse,55 the Court was confronted with a police practice
very similar to the roving patrol stops outlawed in Brigoni-Ponce. In Prouse, a
patrolman in a police cruiser stopped a vehicle in order to conduct a license
and registration check. 6 The patrolman stopped the vehicle at random as he
used during nighttime operation; 9) a "point agent" usually screened vehicles as he brought them to virtually
a complete stop, and if further investigation was necessary, directed motorists to a secondary investigation
area; 10) average duration of stop in secondary investigation was three to five minutes. Id. at 545-47. Drunk
Drivers in Indiana supra note 2, at 1070 n. 38.
1d. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
'Id.
471d.
41According to the government, the average length of an investigation at the secondary inspection area was
three to five minutes. Id. at 547.
41Id. at 557-60. See Brignoni.Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878. According to one study, as of 1975 "there were as many
as 10 to 12 million aliens illegally in the country." Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551 (citing Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 878).
"Martinez-Fuere, 428 U.S. at 557.
5' See Id.
"387 U.S. 523 (1967).
"Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 565. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
"Martinez v. Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 565.
"440 U.S. 648.
"ld. at 650.
COMMENTSWinter, 19861
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had neither probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that either the
vehicle or any of its occupants were subject to seizure.57 While walking toward
the stopped vehicle, the officer smelled marijuana smoke and seized marijuana
lying in plain view.5" The defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana was
granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court. 9
The United States Supreme Court affirmed holding that:
[Unless] there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a
motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that
either the vehicle or its occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for viola-
tion of the law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order
to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'
In reaching this decision the Court reaffirmed the balancing test used in Brig-
noni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte.61 The Court engaged in the same analysis of
the objective and subjective privacy intrusions caused by roving patrol stops. 62
The Court found that the roving stops involved in Prouse engendered the same
subjective intrusion - the concern or even fright on the part of lawful
travelers - that was fatal to the border stops in Brignoni-Ponce.63 In contrast,
the Court noted that at traffic checkpoints the level of subjective intrusion is
substantially less as "the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped
[and] he can see visible signs of the officer's authority." 6
Also crucial to the Prouse holding is the Court's concern with the officer's
unfettered discretion which underlies random spot checks. 65 The Court noted
that motorists are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy' which
would be seriously circumscribed "were [the motorist] subject to unfettered
governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile."67
Turning to the government interests at stake, the Court agreed that Del-
1d. Emphasizing the discretionary nature of the stop the Court quoted the patrolman as explaining: "I saw
the car in the area and wasn't answering any complaints, so I decided to pull them off." Id. at 650-5 1.
Id. at 650.
"Id. at 651.
"Id. at 663. The Court noted that of the jurisdictions which had considered roving license and registration
checks five had held them to be unconstitutional while six had held to the contrary. Id. at 651. nn.2, 3.
"Id. at 656-57. The Court noted that it had reserved the question of the permissibility of state officials stop-
ping motorists for document checks in a manner similar to a checkpoint detention, see Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 560 n.14, or roving-patrol operations, see Brignoni-Ponce, 422, U.S. at 883 n.8. Prouse, 440 U.S. at
656 n.13.
62See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
"3See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657.
"Id. (quoting Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 894).
"See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661-62.
"Id at 662. The Court noted that this "reasonable expectation of privacy lis not lost] simply because
automobilelsl and [theirl use are subject to government regulations." Id.
"Id. at 663.
[Vol. 19:3
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aware and other states have a vital interest in enforcing licensing and registra-
tion laws."8 However, the Court did not agree with Delaware's contention that
this public interest outweighed the privacy intrusion caused by discretionary
spot checks. 9 The Court articulated two reasons for its conclusion. First, there
were less intrusive alternative means available for enforcing licensing and
registration laws.70 Second, random spot checks were found to be unproductive
n terms of discovering or deterring unlicensed drivers.7' In sum, the Court was
'unconvinced that the incremental contribution to highway safety of the ran-
lom spot check justifies the practice under the Fourth Amendment.""
Adhering to its random versus systematic stop analysis, the Court in dicta
;uggested that license and registration checkpoints would pass constitutional
nuster."1 In a subsequent case, Texas v. Brown,74 a plurality of the Court cited
he Prouse dicta as authorizing license and registration checks.
5ost-Prouse Issues
Although the Court's decisions have made it clear that the permissibility
if suspicionless roadblock stops hinges on adherence to "neutral criteria," they
[ave not articulated a clear test for when the neutral criteria standard is ap-
,licable.75 As a result, courts considering the constitutionality of DUI
oadblocks have reached different conclusions.76 Since Delaware v. Prouse is
he most recent Supreme Court decision regarding automobile stops, several
;sues left unresolved by Prouse are highlighted by subsequent decisions.77
ome unresolved issues relate to the use of roadblocks in general. First, the
rouse Court did not consider the nature of the state interest which might be
dvanced by DUI roadblocks." Second, although recognizing the need to limit
olice discretion and subjective intrusion, Prouse did not explain how these
lements interrelate to form the necessary neutral criteria.79 Third, it is unclear
rd. at 658.
d. at 658-62.
rd. at 659. The Court noted that "[tihe foremost method of enforcing traffic and safety regulations ... is
icting upon observed violations." Id.
'Id. at 659-60. The Court reasoned that since the percentage of unlicensed drivers on the road is very small
in inordinate number of licensed drivers would need to be stopped in order to find one unlicensed operator.
d at 660.
ld. at 659.
S ee supra note 13 and accompanying text.
1460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion). In Brown the defendant was stopped at a drivers license checkpoint
t which time a police officer seized a balloon containing drugs in "plain view." Id. at 733. The state court
did not 'question ... the validity of the officer's initial stop of [the] vehicle as part of a license check."' Id. at
39 (citing Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The plurality noted its approval of
, stop by stating "we agree." Brown, 460 U.S. at 739.
5 ee Filling in the Blanks after Prouse, supra note 14, at 248-49.
I. at 249.
5 ee Drunk Drivers In Indiana, supra note 2, at 1074.
('urbing the Drunk Driver supra note 2, at 1470.
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to what extent the checkpoints mentioned in the Prouse dicta must conform to
the permanent border checkpoints approved in Martinez-Fuerte.s° Fourth,
Prouse was unclear as to whether suspicionless roadblock stops must be
necessary in the sense that they be more effective than less intrusive alter-
native methods."' Finally, several issues are triggered by problems unique to
drunk driving roadblocks. 2
APPLYING THE PRECEDENT: COURT DECISIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ROADBLOCKS
In general, the Courts considering the constitutionality of roadblocks
have not varied their analysis according to the purpose of the stop. 3 In addi-
'Id. Another issue is whether some form of prior judicial approval should be required for the operation of
DUI or other temporary roadblocks. Id. Although Martinez-Fuerte rejected a warrant requirement, this
may have been a result of the permanence of the checkpoint involved. See Id. See also State v. Olgaard, 248
N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976) (DUI checkpoint invalid without prior authorization by judicial warrant).
1See Mass Investigations, supra note 3, at 645-46. See also Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483
N.E.2d 1102 (1985) ("We construe the questions as not raising [the] issue ... whether, for constitutional pur-
poses, it matters whether there be a less intrusive but equally effective means of dealing with the problem.")
There is much debate over the degree of effectiveness of DUI roadblocks. Most of this debate focuses on
the alleged deterrent effect because it is almost universally recognized that DUI roadblocks produce few
DUI arrests. Mass Investigations, supra note 3, at 638. But see Filling in the Blanks after Prouse, supra note
14, at 252.
The reason for the debate over the deterrent effect is largely due to the lack of empirical data showing a
causal relationship between DUI roadblocks and a reduction in alcohol-related accidents. Sobriety Check-
points, supra note 9, at 162-63. Despite claims by those in favor of DUI roadblocks it has not been
demonstrated that their use has reduced drunk driving in any jurisdiction. In fact the reported decreases in
alcohol-related fatalities "are highly unreliable, based upon unpublished and unsubstantiated claims by agen-
cies entrusted with the job of combating drunk driving and anxious to demonstrate success." Mass Investiga-
tions, supra note 3, at 642.
2Curbing the Drunk Driver, supra note 77, at 1470. Some of these issues are triggered by the inherently
discretionary and personal nature of drunk driving investigations. It is clear that drunk driving roadblock in-
vestigations are more subjectively and objectively intrusive than the suspicionless searches and seizures that
the Supreme Court has approved. See Mass Investigations, supra note 3, at 650-58. Unlike license and
registration checks, which are limited and impersonal, drunk driving investigations are extensive. They re-
quire a police officer to make a highly discretionary evaluation of the driver's personal attributes and
behavior. Id. at 650.
[This] discretionary assessment of the motorist's sobriety ... lends itself to nearly as much whim and
caprice as the random stopping of vehicles invalidated in Prouse. This result is paradoxical, though,
because the Prouse roadblock was specifically intended to eradicate such police discretion. The discre-
tionary activities purportedly curtailed by adherence to the Prouse formula perforce reappear the in-
stant the license and registration check is used to gauge sobriety.
Random Seizures, supra note 7, at 205.
Other unanswered issues relate to the nature and extent of a post-stop investigation where the driver does
not exhibit "obvious" signs of intoxification.
Should one be required to step out of his car only if there is an articulable and reasonable suspicion
that he is intoxicated, or is it a reasonable seizure under the fourth amendment to require each
motorist to leave his vehicle in order to judge the manner of his walk? Should some drivers be required
to exit their cars while others are allowed to remain. . .? Are the observation of eye movements and
smelling of breath reasonable at a sobriety checkpoint? If so, what of the recalcitrant driver who
refuses to roll his window beyond the few inches necessary to be audible?
Comment, The Prouse Dicta: From Random Stops to Sobriety Checkpoints 20 IDAHO L. REV. 127, 145-46
(1984).
3See Random Seizures, supra note 7, at 204-205.
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tion, decisions both upholding roadblocks," and striking them down85 have
largely focused on procedural issues regarding officer discretion and subjective
and objective intrusion without analyzing the larger constitutional questions
involved. 6
This section presents several decisions which reflect the various ap-
proaches used in evaluating the constitutionality of roadblock stops. First, de-
cisions upholding the roadblocks are analyzed. Second, decisions holding DUI
roadblocks unconstitutional regardless of the procedures are analyzed, sug-
gesting that the neutral criteria standard is not applicable to DUI roadblocks.
Decisions Holding Roadblocks Constitutional
In State v. Deskins,87 the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld a roadblock
ostensibly set up for the purpose of checking driver's licenses. Since the state
conceded that the actual purpose for the roadblock was to catch drunk drivers,
the Deskins court phrased the issue in terms of the constitutionality of a DUI
roadblock under the factual situation before it.8
The Deskins roadblock was conducted by a combination of thirty-five of-
ficers from three different law enforcement agencies. All vehicles proceeding in
both directions were stopped and their drivers checked to determine if they
were carrying valid licenses. The defendant was stopped at around 1:20 A.M.
A state trooper approached the car and requested the defendant's license. At
this point the officer noted signs of intoxication and asked the defendant to
step out of the car. 9 After failing a field sobriety test, the defendant was ar-
rested for driving while intoxicated.
In reaching its decision, the Deskins court quoted extensively from Del-
aware v. Prouse9" and analyzed other federal and state court decisions relevant
to the constitutionality of roadblock stops and ultimately concluded that
"See People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473, N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984) (DUI roadblock); State v.
Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984) (DUI roadblock); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485,479 A.2d 903
(1984) (DUI roadblock); United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 832, reh'g
denied, 454 U.S. 1069 (1981) (license and registration check); State v. Shankle, 58 Or. App. 134, 647 P.2d
959 (1982) (license and registration check); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979) (Game Warden
roadblock to check for compliance with hunting laws).
OSee infra note 125.
'Mass Investigations, supra note 3, at 597-98. This fundamental question is whether a DUI roadblock is in-
ierently unconstitutional because it involves a seizure which is not supported by probable cause or any other
Jegree of individualized suspicion. See Id. at 598.
'234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983).
'Id. at 531, 673 P.2d 1177.
11d. The court notes that before the stop the officer had no reason to suspect that the defendant was intox-
cated or violating any other criminal laws. Id.
ld.
"1440 U.S. 648 (1979). See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
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"[these] decisions ... make it clear that not every driver's license check or DUI
roadblock is constitutionally impermissible."92 The court considered these deci-
sions as authorizing the use of the fourth amendment balancing test to deter-
mine the reasonableness of DUI roadblocks.93 Specifically, the court
enumerated thirteen factors it considered necessary to determine whether a
DUI roadblock meets the balancing test in favor of the state.9
In applying its balancing analysis, the Deskins court first took judicial
notice of the grave public concern caused by drunk driving.95 After noting that
most courts have found the procedures used at drivers license and DUI
roadblocks to violate the tests implied in Prouse, the Deskins court advanced
two ways in which DUI roadblocks serve the public interest. The court stated:
[tlhe use of a DUI roadblock has principally two purposes: (1) to ap-
prehend and remove the drunk driver from the streets before injury or
property damages results, and (2) in serving as a deterrent to convince the
potential drunk driver to refrain from driving in the first place. As a fringe
benefit the DUI roadblock also serves to disclose other violations pertain-
ing to licenses, vehicle defects, open containers, etc.96
Applying its thirteen factor test to the roadblock before it, the court con-
cluded that the initial stop of the defendant occurred under conditions which
met the minimal criteria for a constitutionally permissible momentary
seizure. 9 In support of its conclusion the court recited the procedures used at
the roadblock, emphasizing the constraints on officer discretion and steps
taken to reduce both subjective and objective intrusion. The court then
91Deskins, 234 Kan. at 542, 673 P.2d at 1184.
931d. The Deskins court noted that the applicable test is the three-prong balancing test set out in Brown v.
Texas. Id. at 541, 673 P.2d at 1184. See supra note 18.
'According to the Deskins court these are:
(1) The degree of discretion; if any, left to the officer in the field; (2) the location designated for the
roadblock; (3) the time and duration of the roadblock; (4) standards set by superior officers; (5) ad-
vance notice to the public at large; (6) advance warning to the individual approaching motorist; (7)
maintenance of safety conditions (8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of operation; (9)
average length of time each motorist is detained; (10) physical factors surrounding the location, type
and method of operation; (I1) the availability of less intrusive methods for combating the problem;
(12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and (13) any other factor which might bear upon the
test.
Deskins, 234 Kan. 541, 673, P.2d at 1185. The court added that not all of the factors need be favorable to
the state. However a roadblock involving unbridled officer discretion would be invalid under Prouse
regardless of other favorable factors. Id.
"The court stated: "it is obvious, without resort to the record ... that the problem of the drunk driver is one
of enormous magnitude affecting every citizen who ventures forth upon the streets and highways." Id. at
536, 672 P.2d at 1181.
"Id. at 536-37, 673 P.2d at 1182. Several other courts have upheld DUI roadblocks by stressing their effec-
tiveness as a deterrent to driving under the influence. See Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984);
People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E,2d 1,483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1983); State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz.
45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984). Contra State v. Koppel, - N.H. -, 449 A.2d 977 (1985) (the alleged deterrent ef-
fect of DUI roadblocks has not been demonsrated).
'"Id. at 542, 673 P.2d at 1185.
"The Deskins court stressed that the roadblock was a joint effort of three law enforcement agencies. Id. The
thirty-five participating officers were in uniform and attended a briefing given by supervisory personnel. Id.
[Vol. 19:3
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakro .edu/ak onlawreview/vol19/iss3/6
summed up its balancing analysis by stating:
[wihen we consider the enormity of the injury and damage caused by the
drinking driver and the vital interest of every citizen in being protected so
far as possible upon the streets and roadways, we find that the public in-
terest in a properly conducted DUI roadblock containing appropriate
safeguards outweighs the individual's right to be free from unfettered in-
trusion upon his fourth amendment rights.99
In dissent, Justice Prager stressed the ineffectiveness of the roadblock. He
concluded that the state had failed to meet its burden in establishing that the
roadblock promoted the public interest in light of the less intrusive alternatives
available to combat the drunk driving problem."° These alternatives would not
have entailed the stopping of between 2,000 and 3,000 motorists.10' Because
drunk drivers generate articulable cues, 02 "the same or greater productivity
could have been achieved by distributing the thirty-five officers throughout the
city for the sole purpose of observing erratic driving and stopping and checking
drivers."'' 0 Justice Prager also noted his concern that, by upholding this DUI
roadblock, the majority had authorized other police agencies to set up road-
blocks to discover violations of other criminal statutes and city ordinances.'1
In State v. Coccomol"5 the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld a
roadblock conducted pursuant to written guidelines issued by the Roxberg
Chief of Police.16 The purpose of the roadblock was to check the driver for his
At the briefing the officers were advised to check for driver's licenses and signs of drunk driving. id. The
roadblock was located on a well-lighted four-lane highway and marked by police cars with flashing red
lights. Id There were sufficient officers present to assure only brief intrusions. Id. Field officer discretion
was minimized because officers were required to stop all vehicles. Id. Finally, the location of the roadblock
was selected by supervisory personnel and not the officers in the field. Id.
"Id. In a postscript to its decision, the court suggested that the legislature or attorney general establish
minimum uniform standards for roadblock operations, rather than leaving this to police officials, Id. at 543,
673 P.2d at 1185-86.
"®The roadblock was in effect for four hours and between 2,000 and 3,000 vehicles were stopped. Id. at 546,
673 P.2d at 1188. Out of the seventy-four violations discovered only fifteen were for DWI. Id. During this
period the thirty-five officers on duty logged a total of 140 man hours. Id. at 545, 673 P.2d at 1187 (Pragen,
J., dissenting).
I101d.
"'in this respect Justice Prager distinguished observable DUI violations from "[vjiolations of motor vehicle
license laws and the transportation of illegal aliens which are [not] physically apparent through mere obser-
vation of traffic." Id.
0I31d.
"I4 d. at 547, 673 P.2d at 1188. Justice Prager illustrated his concern by stating: "If each .. political subdivi-
sion decides to maintain a roadblock, we could have 'Checkpoint Charley' at the boundry of every city and
every county." Id.
1"1177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980).
"'Id. at 579, 427 A.2d at 133. These guidelines were promoted by the county prosecutor who sent a sum-
mary of the Prouse decision along with a set of regulations approved by the New Jersey Attorney General to
all New Jersey Police Chiefs. The Roxbury Chief of Police used these guidelines in a memorandum direct to
ris officers. This memorandum stated: "should roadcheck be made for driving while intoxicated.., its shall
ae this department's procedure to stop every 5th car during light traffic hours." Id. at 579 n. I, 427 A.2d at
133 n.I.
COMMENTSWinter, 19861
13
Freed: Seizure By Roadblock
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
AKRON LAW REVIEW
license, registration and insurance card, as well as for any signs of
intoxication."7 According to the predetermined procedure, every fifth vehicle
going past the checkpoint was stopped and diverted into a parking lot where
the driver was asked for the required documentation.'0
After balancing the state's vital interest in detecting and prosecuting
drunk drivers with the minor inconvenience which may be caused to every
fifth motorist, the court concluded that the roadblock advanced the state's in-
terest sufficiently to outweigh any privacy intrusion)19 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court noted that the roadblock was located in an area with several
bars and a high incidence of alcohol-related accidents."0 Also important was
the timing of the roadblock, which was only effected in the early morning
hours coinciding with the closing hours of local taverns."' These factors sug-
gested a high probability of success while minimizing the number of innocent
motorists stopped. The court also noted that the planned physical
characteristics of the roadblock promoted safety and minimized subjective in-
trusion,"' while the written procedures minimized officer discretion. The court
summed up its analysis by stating: "the Roxbury police follow specific, defined
standards in stopping motorists .. . [tihe criterion they employ is purely
neutral; no discretion is involved.""'
In a recent decision, Commonwealth v. Trumble, "' the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts denied the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence obtained at a DUI roadblock conducted by State Police in
Sunderland."5 The roadblock was conducted according to guidelines pro-
mulgated by the Secretary of Public Safety."6
107Id.
"'Iid. The defendant's car was stopped according to procedure and directed to the secondary inspection area,
where he was asked to produce his driving credentials. The requesting officer noticed that the defendant
showed signs of intoxication and directed him to step out of the car. The defendant was arrested after he failed
several field sobriety tests. Id.
" 'Id. at 583-84, 427 A.2d at 135.
"'ld. at 582, 427 A.2d at 134.
"'Id at 583, 427 A.2d at 135.
"
2Id. These characteristics were: 1) stopping every fifth vehicle only when traffic is light; 2) positioning flares
on the road to caution drivers to be alert; 3) positioning a uniformed officer counting cars at the end of the
line of flares under a street light; 4) positioning a marked police car at the side of the road; 5) diverting traffic
to an adjacent parking lot where they were questioned by uniformed officers. Id.
11Id.
14396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985).
"'Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 1108.
"'Id. at , 483 N.E.2d at 1104. The guidelines were developed in response to the court's decision in Com-
monwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983), which held a previous roadblock un-
constitutional. The McGeoghegan court noted that the roadblock area was poorly illuminated and unsafe
for motorists; the mechanics of the roadblock were left to field officers; field officers used their own discre-
tion in choosing which cars to stop; motorists were backed up on the highway for two-thirds of a mile.
McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at 142, 449 N.E.2d at 353.
The McGeoghegan court added that a roadblock would be constitutionally permissible if: 1) the selection
of vehicles to be stopped is not arbitrary; 2) safety is assured; 3) motorists' inconvenience is minimized; 4) the
procedure is conducted pursuant to a plan devised by supervisory law enforcement personnel. Id.
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The Trumble court first took notice that the traditional methods of deal-
ing with the drunk driving problem have failed."7 In this light, the court
balanced the public's interest in curtailing drunk driving against the intrusion
caused by a momentary seizure"' at the roadblock, and found that the intru-
sion was outweighed by the degree to which the roadblock advanced the public
interest."9 Supporting its decision, the court first noted that the site of the
Sunderland roadblock was selected by supervisory personnel for maximum
safety and efficiency. 2 ' Second, the court noted that the roadblock was con-
ducted pursuant to operational guidelines designed to minimize field officer
discretion and subjective intrusion.' According to the operational guidelines,
the thirteen uniformed state troopers at the roadblock had no discretion in
choosing vehicles to be stopped.' Signs and flares marked the approach to the
stopping area. 3 Four cruisers were positioned close to the stopping area which
was brightly illuminated by lights from a police van.124 "In sum, the conduct of
the roadblock was most reasonable and entirely responsive to the requirements
laid down in McGeoghegan. "25
Decisions Holding Roadblocks Unconstitutional
Several courts have struck down roadblocks while noting that a roadblock
conducted with adequate procedural safeguards would be constitutional.'2
'"Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, -, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (1985).
"aThe troopers conducting the roadblock were instructed that the initial contact would be no more than one
minute for each driver. Id. at __, 483 N.E.2d at 1105. The troopers were also instructed to observe the driver
for suspicion that he had been drinking. Id. If the trooper suspected that the driver was intoxicated the driver
was directed into a detention area where he was asked to produce a license and registration and perform
three field sobriety tests. Id.
"'Id. at _, 483 N.E.2d at 1107. The court noted that it was not deciding whether for constitutional purposes
it matters whether there may be a less intrusive but equally effective means available, as the issue was not
raised by the parties. Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 1105.
However, the Trumble dissenters concluded that the Commonwealth had not met its burden of showing
that "such a procedure [achieves] a degree of law enforcement and highway safety that is not reasonably at-
tainable by less intrusive means." Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 1112 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (quoting Com-
monwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 143-43, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353).
"'Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 1108. Following the operational guidelines the supervisory officer in charge of the
roadblock selected the site according to four criteria: 1) high accident rates; 2) high rates of drunk driving ar-
rests; 3) safety conditions; 4) motorists convenience. Id. at -, 493 N.E.2d at 1104.
"'Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 1104. The court also noted with approval the advance media attention focused on
the roadblocks as a result of press releases and interviews with the roadblock supervisor. Id. This advance
publicity "ha[s] the virtue of reducing surprise, fear, and inconvenience." Id. at 1106.
1id. The roadblock supervisor instructed the troopers to stop every vehicle that approached the site and
stressed that there were to be no deviations from the procedures set forth in the guidelines. Id. at -, 483
N.E.2d at 1104. See supra note 117.
1231d
"
124jd
"
1"'Id. See supra note 115. In a similarly reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court of Arizona upheld a DUI
roadblock conducted pursuant to guidelines suggested in a concurring opinion in State ex rel. Ekstrom v.
Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983). See State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073
(1984). Also crucial to the Arizona Court's decision was evidence of the roadblock's deterrent effect. Id. at
49-50, 691 P.2d at 1076-77.
"'See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 991 (1983) (DUI roadblock); Jones v.
State, 459 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (DUI roadblock); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389
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However, the decisions that follow have struck down DUI roadblocks as un-
constitutional regardless of the procedures used.
In State v. Koppel,' the court granted the defendant's motions to sup-
press evidence obtained at two different DUI roadblocks."' In doing so, the
court relied upon the independent protection against unreasonable searches
and seizure provided by the state constitution.'29
The Koppel roadblocks were conducted by the Concord Police Depart-
ment according to "Standard and Operating Procedure[s]" (SOP) drafted by a
department research officer. 30 Both roadblocks consisted of several officers
and three or more marked police cars parked near the side of the road with
their lights on.' When traffic was light, police stopped every car approaching
the roadblock.' "If five cars were detained at the roadblock, other traffic was
waived on until a car left the roadblock, at which time the next car to approach
would be detained."' 33
The Koppel court began its constitutional analysis by noting that several
courts had upheld drunk driving roadblocks conducted according to similar
procedures by relying on the Prouse dictum.13 However, the court noted "that
unlike the spot checks in Prouse, the roadblocks here were conducted to dis-
cover evidence to be used in the prosecution of serious criminal offenses."1
Distilling its earlier decisions concerning motor vehicle seizures, the court stat-
ed:
[t]o justify a search or seizure of a motor vehicle, absent probable cause or
even a reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense is being committed,
the State must prove that its conduct significantly advances the public in-
Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983) (DUI roadblock); State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (1985)
(DUI roadblock); State v. Hillishiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980) (detection of vandals); State v. Mar-
chand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 224 (1985) (license and registration check); State v. Goehring, 374
N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1985) (Safety check).
127 N.H. -, 499 A.2d 977 (1985).
2ind. at -, 499 A.2d at 979. The two defendants were stopped at different roadblocks and arrested for driv-
ing while intoxicated. Id.
'
21d. at -, 499 A.2d at 981 (relying on N.H. Const. art XIX, part 1).
0MId. at..., 499 A.2d at 979. The SOP stressed several points: that the roadblock should involve "minimal in-
trusion;" that its location should be determined by an official based on objective data (i.e. the number of ac-
cidents, injury accidents and/or DWI arrests); "that the decision as to which vehicles will be stopped (e.g. all
east-bound vehicles, or every tenth vehicle) cannot be left to the discretion of the officers at the scene but
must be made in advance; "and that the checkpoint must be clearly indicated and manned by uniform of-
ficers." Id. (quoting the Standard Operating Procedures).
131 Id.
132[Id.
133Id.
m'Id. at -, 499 A.2d at 981 (citing State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 48-49, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076-77
(1984); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 498, 497 A.2d 903, 909 (1984); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 540-42,
673 P.2d 1174, 1179 (1983)).
"'Koppel, - N.H. at -, 499 A.2d at 981.
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terest in a manner that outweighs the accompanying intrusion on in-
dividual rights. It must further prove that no less intrusive means is
available to accomplish the State's goal.'36
Applying the above mentioned test, the court first noted that the state had failed
to show that the DUI roadblocks were more effective than less intrusive alter-
native means.'37 In evaluating alternative methods, the court noted that
roadblocks are much less effective in detecting drunk drivers than roving
patrols acting on observed violations.' The court also considered the possible
deterrent effect of DUI roadblocks and concluded that "there is nothing in this
record, or in the decisions from other jurisdictions, to indicate that a roadblock
program has any greater deterrent effect than a well-publicized program of
highly visible roving patrols."'39
Turning to the actual degree of intrusion, the court noted that DUI
roadblocks involve "a substantially greater degree of subjective intrusion -
the generation of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers"'' than
do roadblocks conducted to detect unlicensed drivers or illegal aliens. 4, This
higher degree of subjective intrusion is a result of the nature of DUI
roadblocks which, unlike the permanent checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, are
"temporary,... usually set up only at night, sometimes poorly illuminated,
whose purpose becomes known only when the driver is asked for his or her
license."'42 In sum, the Koppel court found that "the state had failed to show
that drunk driving roadblocks produce sufficient public benefit to outweigh
their intrusion on individual rights."' 143
In State v. Smith, 14 the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma held the
use of temporary DUI roadblocks per se unconstitutional regardless of their
specific operational details.'45 The roadblocks at issue were conducted by the
Oklahoma Department of Public Safety in conjunction with three law enforce-
ment agencies. '"The defendant was stopped at a roadblock in Oklahoma City,
"ld.
171d.
111d. The court noted that Concord police set up forty-seven roadblocks on twenty-one weekend nights. A
otal of 1,680 vehicles were stopped, resulting in only eighteen DWI arrests. During roughly the same six-
nonth period, the Concord police made 175 DWI arrests using roving patrols. Id. at -, 499 A.2d at 979.
"Id. at -, 499 A.2d at 982.
1Id. at -, 499 A.2d at 983 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558).
'Id.
'Id.
'Id. See also State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 382 (S.D. 1980). In Olgaard the court struck down a temporary
)UI roadblock as unconstitutional. Id. at 394. The Olgaard court considered Martinez-Fuerte to require
ermanent checkpoints. Id. The court noted that the subjective intrusion caused at a temporary checkpoint
much greater "for by its very nature the roadblock [is] set up to stop without prior warning, and.., by sur-
rise, all motorists who happened to pass that particular point on the night in question." Id.
'674 P,2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
'See Id. at 565.
"'Id. at 562. The roadblock was part of a joint effort by the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, the
Winter, 1986] COMMENTS
17
Freed: Seizure By Roadblock
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
AKRON LAW REVIEW
one of six conducted that night from 9:30 P.M. through 1:30 A.M."7 The
roadblocks were manned by teams of ten officers, with supervisory personnel
at every site.' The officers would either stop all cars or stop cars according to
an established interval. If traffic backed up, several cars would be allowed to
pass through without being stopped."9
In reaching its decision the Smith court contrasted the Oklahoma City
roadblocks with the permanent checkpoint approved in Martinez-Fuerte. Ac-
cordingly, the court inquired as to: "1) the type of checkpoint involved; 2) the
purpose of the checkpoint; and, 3) the degree of intrusion and fright endured
by individuals passing through the checkpoint."'' ° First, the court noted that
the roadblocks at issue were temporary, and not the type of permanent check-
point approved in Martinez-Fuerte. "I Second, the court found as a matter of
fact that the roadblocks were established for the primary purpose of seeking
criminal DUI offenders.' Third, the court noted that the permissibility of the
suspicionless stops in Martinez-Fuerte hinged on the level of subjective intru-
sion involved.'53 Subjective intrusion at the Martinez-Fuerte checkpoints was
reduced because the checkpoints "were permanent; they were regular; they
were within the everyday knowledge of the community." ' Thus, those in the
community were not surprised or fearful when passing through as they knew
of the roadblock's existence. The court also noted that the stop in Martinez-
Fuerte was not to seek out criminals, but to enforce immigration laws and
deport those illegally in the country.
In contrast to Martinez-Fuerte, the Smith court stated:
[tihe roadblocks in the present case could well act, and most likely did act,
as a total surprise to those passing through. The fear factor involved in
this case is heightened by the presence of at least ten officers, chemical
testing equipment, and mobile booking and jail vans actually on the
scene. To the individual approaching such a roadblock, it is not unlikely
that he would reasonably perceive the officers as being desirous of ar-
resting criminals and that anyone passing through could easily be ar-
rested. The United States Supreme Court has never stretched the perma-
Oklahoma Highway Patrol, the Oklahoma City Police Department, and the Oklahoma County Sheriffs Of-
fice. Id.
"1d. at 563.
1491d
"
1491d
15Id.
151 d.
'51d. at 564. Witnesses for the state maintained that the roadblock was established to check driver's licenses.
Id. However, the court noted that there was overwhelming evidence that the purpose of the roadblocks was
to catch drunk drivers. Id. First, the roadblocks were conducted on weekend nights. Id. Second, statements
made to the media proceeding the roadblocks referred to the need to get drunk drivers off the road. Id.
'"Id. at 565.
''Id. at 564.
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nent roadblock exception to this point.... The subjective intrusion...
imposed upon the individual innocent of misconduct is simply too great."5
The Smith court also noted a more generalized concern with the use of DUI
roadblocks. The court stated:
[We] find such activities by law enforcement authorities, while commend-
able in their ultimate goal of removing DUI offenders from the public
highways, draw dangerously close to what may be referred to as a police
state. Here, the state agencies have ignored the presumption of innocence,
assuming that criminal conduct must be occurring on the roads and
highways, and have taken an 'end justifies the means' approach .... Were
the authorities allowed to maintain such activities as presented in this
case, the next logical step would be to allow similar stops for searching out
other types of criminal offenders. 56
CONCLUSION
Roadblocks designed to detect and deter drunk drivers are in use in a
number of states. These roadblocks are in large part a result of Delaware v.
Prouse and other case law which develops a neutral criteria standard for judg-
ing the reasonableness of suspicionless roadblock-type automobile stops. The
key to the permissibility of suspicionless roadblock stops is what the Supreme
Court considers to be a lower level of subjective intrusion when motorists are
stopped en masse. Thus, in certain circumstances, suspicionless roadblock
stops may be reasonable.
In order to invoke the neutral criteria standard there must be: 1) a com-
pelling government interest; 2) which cannot be achieved by less intrusive
means; 3) which results in a privacy intrusion which is both objectively and
subjectively minimal.'57 Once this is shown, a suspicionless roadblock stop is
governed under the neutral criteria standard. The neutral criteria standard re-
quires that motorists be stopped according to a plan devised by supervisory of-
ficers involving neutral and predetermined criteria.
'"Id. See People v. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d 575, 466 N.E.2d 346 (1984). The Bartley court held DUI
roadblocks per se unconstitutional. The Bartley court gave two reasons for its holding. First, the court found
that Prouse and Martinez-Fuerte sanction the use of checkpoint stops only when there is no other less in-
trusive but equally effective means of detecting violators. Bartley, 125 Iil. App. 3d at 578, 466 N.E.2d at
348. Since there are practical alternatives (i.e. observing violations) to DUI roadblocks there use is not sanc-
tioned. Id. Second, the degree of intrusion at DUI roadblocks is much higher than can be supported by the
neutral criteria standard. See Id. The Bartley court stated:
DUI roadblocks are designed to be set up at night, without warning and at locations which are con-
stantly changing. Motorists are often unaware of the reason for the stop prior to being asked to
display their driver's license. Lights are shined into their eyes and officers peer into the passenger com-
partment of their automobile.
Bartley. 125 Ill. App. 3d at 579, 466 N.E.2d at 348. See also State v. McLaughlin, - Ind. App. -, 471
N.E.2d 1125 (1984). (DUI roadblocks unconstitutional as there are less intrusive methods for combating
drunk driving.
'-Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 564.
1'See Filling in the Blanks After Prouse, supra note II, at 249.
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Eliminating drinking drivers from the road is no doubt a compelling gov-
ernment interest. However, as the Koppel and Smith courts noted, applying
the neutral criteria standard to drunk driving roadblocks may not be proper.
This is because of several differences between DUI roadblocks and the license
and immigration checkpoints involved in Supreme Court precedents. First,
driving while intoxicated is a visible offense which can be detected without re-
sort to roadblock stops. Second, DUI roadblock investigations are personal and
seek evidence of a serious crime. Third, DUI roadblocks are usually set up at
night in constantly changing locations and thus involve a greater level of sub-
jective intrusion. Finally, regardless of whether the initial stop is conducted ac-
cording to neutral criteria, the determination of a driver's sobriety is an inher-
ently discretionary action. Until the Supreme Court resolves these differences
there will continue to be uncertainty regarding the use of DUI roadblocks.
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